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Abstract: 
Jeffrey's rule of conditioning has been proposed in 
order to revise a probability measure by another 
probability function. We generalize it within the 
framework of the models based on belief 
functions. We show that several forms of Jeffrey's 
conditionings can be defined that correspond to the 
geometrical rule of conditioning and to 
Dempster's rule of conditioning, respectively. 
1. Jeffrey's rule in probability theory. 
In probability theory conditioning on an event . is 
classically obtained by the application of Bayes' rule. Let 
(Q, � , P) be a probability space where P(A) is the 
probability of the event Ae � where� is a Boolean 
algebra defined on a finite2 set n. P(A) quantified the 
degree of belief or the objective probability, depending on 
the interpretation given to the probability measure, that a 
particular arbitrary element m of n which is not a priori 
located in any of the sets of� belongs to a particular set 
Ae�. Suppose it is known that m belongs to Be� and 
P(B)>O. The probability measure P must be updated into 
PB that quantifies the same event as previously but after 
taking in due consideration the know ledge that me B. PB 
is obtained by Bayes' rule of conditioning: 
This rule can be obtained by requiring that: 
81: VBE�. PB(B) = 1 
82: VBe�, VX,Ye� such that X.Y�B. 
and 
PJ3(X) _ P(X) 
PB(Y)- P(Y) 
PB(Y) = 0 
ifP(Y)>O 
ifP(Y) = 0. 
Jeffrey (1965) has considered a generalization of Bayes' 
rule where the updating information does not correspond 
1 This work has been partially funded by the CEC-ESPRIT Ill 
Basic Research Project 6156 (DRUMS II), and the 
Communaute Franyaise de Belgique, ARC 92/97-160 
(BELON). 
2 For simplicity sake, we only consider finite spaces. 
to the knowledge that me B, which implies that the 
updated probability should give a probability 1 to B (see 
Bl ), but to the weaker requirement that there is a new 
probability measure on a sub-algebra $ of� , and the 
updated probability should give these probability weights 
to the elements of .:lJ. 
Let (Q, �, Pt) be the initial probability space. Let$ be 
a subalgebra of �. Let (Q, $, P2) be the new 
probability space. P2 corresponds to the updating 
information that in fact m belongs to Xe .:lJ with 
probability P2(X). The problem is to update Pt into 
some P3 defined on� and such that P3(X) = P2(X) 
VXe$. P3 is the result of revising Pt by the probability 
measure P2, adopting P2 wherever P2 is defined. 
Bayes' rule corresponds to the limiting case where one of 
the atoms3 of$ receives a probability one, i.e. there is 
one atom B of .:lJ with P2(B) = 1. Bayes' rule tells 
nothing on how to build P3 from Pt and P2 in the 
generalized case. Let IB = {B1, B2 ... Bn l be the set of 
atoms on$. Jeffrey requires that P3 should satisfy two 
requirements: 
R2: VBE IB, VX,Ye� such that X,Y�B. 
and 
P3(X) 
_ 
P1 (X) 
P3(Y)- Pt(Y) 
P3(Y) = 0 
ifP1(Y)>O 
ifP1(Y) = 0. 
These two requirements lead to Jeffrey's rule of 
conditioning: 
where P1 (AlB)= 0 if P1 (B)= 0. 
3 An atom of an algebra is a non empty element of the 
algebra which intersection with the other elements of the 
algebra equals itself or is empty. When the algebra is a power 
set, the atoms are the singletons. 
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In this paper, we generalize this rule in a context where 
beliefs are quantified by belief functions. Before 
introducing the generalized Jeffrey rules of conditioning, 
we present the concepts of revision and focusing. 
Depending on the type of conditioning event, revision 
leads to several rules, in particular the geometrical rule 
and Dempster's rule of conditioning. Both admit a 
generalization in the spirit of Jeffrey's rules of 
conditioning. Multiplicity of conditioning rules was 
already presented in Smets (1991). Previous attempts to 
generalize Jeffrey's rules of conditioning are discussed in 
the conclusions. 
2. Revision versus focusing. 
1. Dubois and Prade (1991a) have introduced beautifully 
the difference between two types of conditioning : 
Case 1. A die has been tossed. You assess the 
probability that the outcome is 'Six'. Then a reliable 
witness says that the outcome is an even number. How do 
you update the probability that the outcome is 'six' 
taking in due consideration the new piece of information. 
Case 2. Hundred dice have been tossed. You assess the 
proportion of 'six'. Then you decide to focus your interest 
on the dice with an even outcome. How do you compute 
the proportion of 'six' among the dice with an even 
outcome. 
Case 1 corresponds to a revision4 as the probability is 
modified to take in account a new piece of information. 
Case 2 corresponds to a focusing : no new piece of 
information is introduced, we just consider another 
reference class by focusing our attention on a given subset 
of the original set. 
In probability theory, the distinction is more conceptual 
than practical as both cases are solved by Bayes' rule of 
conditioning. It might explain the lack of interest for such 
a distinction. We restrict ourselves to the revision case 
and study what happens when probability measures are 
replaced by belief functions like in the TransferabJe Belief 
Model (Smets, 1988, Smets and Kennes, 1990), in 
Dempster-Shafer Model (Shafer, 1976a) and in the Hints 
Model (Kohlas and Mooney, 1990). 
2. We consider first the probability of provability 
(deductibility) approach (Pearl 1988, Ruspini 1986). It is 
not different from the original Dempsterian approach 
4 In Dubois and Prade (1991), they called it an 'updating' but 
they prefer to call it now (Dubois and Prade 1992) a revision 
in harmony with the Alchouroron, Gardenfors and Makinson 
approach (Giirdenfors, 1988) where revision concerns the 
beliefs held by an agent. They reserve 'updating' for the case 
considered by Katsuno and Mendelzon (1991) that concerns 
the update of an evolving world. 
(Dempster 1967) but it provides a nice framework. It can 
be described as follows. 
Let� be a finite Boolean algebra of propositions. These 
propositions are called the hypothesis. Let$ be another 
finite Boolean algebra of propositions. We assume that 
for every hypothesis He� there is a set D... (H) = {Lj: 
Lie$, i=1, 2 .. r} of propositions Lj provable under H. 
Let M(H) = L1 &Lz ... &Lr be the conjunction of all these 
propositions in D....(H). M(H)e$ as $ is a Boolean 
algebra. M is a function from� to$. 
So: VHe�, 3M(H)e$ such that 
HI-L for every Le$ such that M(H)I-L. 
Suppose there is a probability measure P�:� �[0,1] on 
2� and let p� �� [0,1] be the related probability 
function on� with p�(H) = P�({H}) for every He�. 
Note that� is already an algebra, usually the power set 
of some set. As ..le�. PS8'(..l) may be positive. 
Given the function M:� �$ , we can define the 
probability P$ that Le$ is provable (deductible) and ---.L 
is not provable, denoted P$(�L). We use the symbol 
�in HI->L to mean HI-L and Hff-,L, and in P��L) to 
enhance the fact that those H that would also prove ---.L are 
not included in it. P$(�L) is the probability that an 
hypothesis selected randomly in � (according to the 
probability measure P�) proves L and does not prove ...,L 
(thus eliminating the hypothesis equivalent to the 
contradiction, denoted ..l): 
P$(�L) = P�({H : He�. H�L}) = I p�(H) 
H�L 
Let bel:$ -7[0, I] be the belief function5 on$ induced by 
a basic belief assignment m on$. By definition bel(L) is 
the sum of the basic belief masses given to the 
propositions that imply L without implying ...,L (thus 
excluding ..l): 
bel(L)= I m (X) 
X:Xe.z',XI�L 
It can be shown that P$(�L), LE$ is equal to the belief 
function bel$ on $ induced by the basic belief 
assignment m$:$'�[0,1] with: 
m$CL) = I p�(H) 
H:M(H)=L 
and m$(L) = 0 if the sum is taken over an empty set. 
5 bel is an unnormalized belief function as we do not require 
m(..l)=O (Smets 1988, 1992a). When m(..l)>O, then bel(T) = 
pl(T) <1. 
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One has: 
P.z(�L) = L p�(H) = L p�(M(H)) 
H:H�L H:M(H)�L 
= L L p�(H))= L m.z<W 
Li �L H:M(H)=Li Li �L 
So: P.z(�L) = bel$(L). 
Similarly the plausibility function pl.z is: 
pl.z(L) = bel_z(T) - bel.�(-.L) = L m.z (X) 
X&U:.l 
where T is the maximal element of$. 
This model is not different from Dempster's model 
(Dempster 1967) and Shafer's translator model (Shafer and 
Tversky 1985, Dubois et al. 1991). Both models consider 
an X domain (the translator-source domain) endowed with 
a probability measure, a Y domain (the message-data 
domain) and a one-to-many mapping from X to Y. The� 
space corresponds to the X domain, the $ to the Y, the 
M mapping to the one-to-many mapping, and P� to the 
probability on X space. 
3. We proceed by considering two revision processes that 
correspond to some data-conditioning and some source­
conditioning, i.e. conditioning on an information relative 
to the data or the source (Moral1993) 
3.1. The data-conditioning fits to the scenario where we 
learn that a particular proposition L * of$ is true. In that 
case, the hypothesis H that was proving all the 
propositions in $ proved by M(H) now proves all 
propositions in $ proved by M(H)&L *. The basic belief 
assignment m.z is updated into m.z* with: 
m.z*(L) = L p�(H) 
H:M(H)&L *=L 
As 'v'LI-L *, L&L *=L , one has: 
pl.z*(L) = I m.z *(X)) 
X&U:.l 
= I I ·  p�(H)) 
X:X&U:.l H:M(H)&L *=X 
= I p�(H) = pl.z(L) 
H:M(H)&L&L *:;t:.l 
This relation corresponds to the unnormalized rule of 
conditioning (Dempster's rule of conditioning without 
normalization (Smets 1993a)). Normalization is achieved 
by further conditioning on L being not equivalent to a 
contradiction. 
3.2. The source-conditioning fits with the following 
scenario. Given L*E $, we consider only those 
hypothesis H that prove L * (without proving -.L *) and 
ask what is then the probability that L is provable for all 
LE$ that prove L *. Therefore we restrict our attention to 
those HE� such that HI--L*, HthL*. Let P$**(�L) be 
the probability that L is provable by one of those 
hypothesis that prove L *. Then: 
= P�(H: H�L I HI--L*) 
P�(H: H!-+L&L*) 
= P�(H: Hi-+L*) 
P�(H: H!-+L) 
= P�(H: Hi-+L*) 
bel$(L&L*) 
= bel.z(L*) 
This is known as the geometrical rule of conditioning 
(Shafer 1976b, Suppes and Zanotti, 1977). 
3.3. When M(H) is an atom of$ for every HE�, the 
whole model collapses into a classical probability model 
and the two conditionings (after appropriate 
normalization) degenerate into the classical Bayes' rule of 
conditioning. Identically if whenever HI--LvL* then 
either HI-L or HI-L *, then bel$ is a probability function 
(Smets 1993b). 
4. Note : This derivation based on the probability of 
provability covers the cases generally considered by 
Dempster-Shafer theory (Dempster 1967), but not all 
those considered by the transferable belief model (TBM) 
where the probability measure on a hypothesis space is 
not necessarily assumed. 
Dempster-Shafer theory has been criticized by the 
Bayesians as inappropriate: they claim that the 
conditioning by Dempster's rule of conditioning is 
inadequate. A strict Bayesian will claim the existence of a 
probability measure P�x$ on the product space �x$ 
and ask for the application of Bayes' rule of conditioning 
on P�x.z. and then the marginalization of the result on 
$. Of course, the available information consists only on 
the marginalization of P�x.z on�. The conditioning 
process cannot be achieved in general by lack of 
appropriate information. Only upper and lower conditional 
probabilities can be computed (Fagin and Halpern, 1990, 
Jaffray, 1992). Dempster's rule of conditioning is then 
inappropriate (Levi, 1983). 
The only way to avoid the Bayesian criticisms consists in 
rejecting the probability measure on the product space 
�x$ i.e. not accepting the Bayesian dogma that there 
exists a probability measure on ANY and EVERY space. 
Rejecting that probability measure on �x$ is what is 
achieved explicitly in the Hints' model of Kohlas (and 
sometimes implicitly in Dempster-Shafer theory). In the 
TBM we even go further by not requiring the existence of 
any hypothesis space � and considering ONL Y the $ 
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space by itself, cutting therefore all links with Dempster­
Shafer model. 
In the TBM, one considers only the basic belief 
assignment m_$' and its related belief function bel$ and 
plausibility function pl$. No concept of some 315 space 
endowed with a probability measure is needed. The 
meaning of m$(L) for Le$ is such that m$(L) is the 
part of belief allocated to L and that could be allocated to 
any propositions L' that prove L if further information 
justifies such transfer. The Dempster's rule of 
conditioning is directly introduced as it is part of the 
overall description of the transferable belief model. The 
geometrical rule is derived if one ask for the proportion of 
the beliefs that support Le$ given they support L*e$. 
Both rules have also been derived axiomatically in Smets 
(1992b) whi1e looking for quantitative representations of 
credibility in general. 
3. Jeffrey's rule applied to belief 
functions. 
Let (Q, �, mt) be a credibility space, where Q is a finite 
set of worlds (the frame of discernment), � is a Boolean 
algebra of subsets built on n and m1 is a basic belief 
assignment defined on�. m1:� �[0,1] and its related 
evidential functions (the belief functions, possibility 
functions, communality functions... built from m 1) 
represent the agent initial belief about which world 
corresponds to the actual world. 
Suppose the agent receives a new piece of evidence that 
tells him that his belief on the elements of a subalgebra 
$ (with IB its set of atoms) should be represented by the 
basic belief assignment mz:$�[0,1]. mz is not defined 
on � but on$. The agent wants to update his initial 
basic belief assignment m1 into a new basic belief 
assignment m3 on � that combines the information 
represented by m1 and mz. The first constraint is 
equivalent to constraint R 1. 
Cl: VXe$, bel3(X) = belz(X) 
For every AE�, let B(A)e$ be the smallest element of 
$ such that A<:: B(A) and there is no other B 'e $ such 
that At:::B' <::B(A). B(A) is the upper approximation of A 
in$ in the sense of the rough sets theory (Pawlak 1982). 
Letd{A) be the set of AE� that share the same B(A). 
The constraint C1 implies that the basic belief 
assignment m3 is such that: 
m3(A) = c(A,B(A)) m (B(A)) 
L, c(X,B(A)) 2 
X: XEd{A) 
where c(A,B(A))�. The proof is based on the fact that the 
constraint C l  imposes that the basic belief masses 
mz(B(A)) be allocated only to the elements Ceti{A). The 
way it is distributed among these C is arbitrary except the 
coefficients c(A,B(A)) must be positive so that m3 is non 
negative. 
The equivalent of constraint R2 is not immediate. In R2, 
we only had to consider the atoms of $, as we were 
dealing with probability functions. Now, we must 
generalize the R2 requirement to every element of$. 
a. Source-conditioning. 
C2F: VBE IB, VX,Ye� such that X,Y<::B, 
bel3(X) 
= 
bel1(XIIB) 
"fbel (Y) O bel3(Y) bel1(YIIB) 1 1 > 
and bel3(Y) = 0 if bel1 (Y) = 0, 
where liB in bel1(.IIB) denotes conditioning according to 
the geometrical rule of conditioning, in which case: 
bel1 (XIIB) bel1 (X) 
bel1(YIIB) bel1(Y) . 
The requirement C2F deals only with the elements of� 
that are subsets of the atoms of $. For the other 
elements of� , we propose: 
C3F: VX, Y e � such that B(X) = B(Y), 
L, m3 ( Z ) L, m 1(ZIIB(X)) 
Z<::X,B(Z)=B(X) 
= 
_Z_<::X_,B:........L (Z)-<-=_B_,_(X)-<-- -
L m 3 ( Z ) r ml(ZIIB(Y)) 
Zt:::Y,B(Z)=B(Y) Zt:::Y ,B(Z) =B(Y) 
(where the left denominator is zero is the right one is 
zero). 
C2F is the particular case of C3F that matches the R2 
requirement. C3F has to be added as belief functions must 
be defined on all the elements of .A;, not only on the 
atoms of .AJ. 
It is straightforward to show that C1F and C3F are 
satisfied iff: 
m 3(A) = ;l
(A) 
mz(B(A)) V A e  � if the 
m 1( X )  
X:XEd{A) 
denominator is positive and m3(A) = 0 otherwise. 
We propose to call this rule the Jeffrey geometric 
rule of conditioning. Indeed, if there is only one 
BE.:B, such that mz(B) = 1, then m3 is the basic belief 
assignment obtained from m 1 by conditioning on B with 
the geometric rule of conditioning. 
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b. Data-conditioning. 
The constraints corresponding to C2F and C3F are: 
C2R: 'v'BE IB, 'v'X,YE� such that X.Y �B. 
bel3(X) bel1(XIB) 
"f bel (YIB) O bel3(Y) bel1(YIB) 1 1 > 
and bel3(Y) = 0 if bel1(YIB) = 0, 
where IB in bel1(.IB) denotes conditioning according to 
Dempster's rule of conditioning. 
C3R: 'v'X,YE� such that B(X) = B(Y), 
L mJ(Z) 
Z�X,B(Z)=B(X) 
L m 3 ( Z) 
Z<.::Y ,B(Z)=B(Y) 
L ml (ZIB(X)) 
Z�X.B(Z)=B(X) 
L ml(ZIB(Y)) 
Z�Y.B(Z)=B(Y) 
(where the left denominator is zero is the right one is 
zero). 
It is straightforward to show that C1R and C3R are 
satisfied iff: 
m3(A) = 
ml(AIB(A)) m2(B(A)) 'v'AE� 
L ml (XIB(A)) 
X:XE�A) 
if the denominator is positive and m3(A) = 0 otherwise. 
We propose to call this rule the Jeffrey-Dempster 
rule of conditioning. Indeed, if there is only one 
BE.iS', such that m2(B) = 1, then m3 is the basic belief 
assignment obtained from m 1 by conditioning on B with 
Dempster's rule of conditioning. 
The justification of C2F and C2R are quite 
straightforward. They are the same as with Jeffrey 
original case. In every atom of $ ,  the ratio of the 
probabilities P3 given to two elements of BE IB is equal 
to the ratio of the conditional probabilities P1 given to 
these elements after conditioning on B. For the belief 
function generalization, we have the choice between 
conditioning by the geometrical rule of conditioning or 
the unnormalized rule of conditioning, therefore the two 
cases. Unfortunately C2R and C2F are not sufficient to 
derive both Jeffrey's rules. The C3F and C3R are 
proposed as the generalization of C2F and C2R to those 
elements of� that intersect several elements of$. 
The C3F and C3R rules are less obvious. Their meaning 
is as follows. Each sum is the part of belief related to the 
basic belief masses given to the elements of� that were 
not yet allocated to some of its subsets by requirement 
C l. That their ratio should be equal is the extension of 
the requirement used in C2F and C2R. Indeed, C3F and 
C3R correspond to the case C2F and C2R when B(X)E lB. 
It could of course be arguable but they seem to be the 
most natural requirements to propose to generalize the 
C2F and C2R requirements. 
4. Conclusions. 
Shafer (1981) has studied Jeffrey's rule. He considers its 
generalization can be found in Dempster's rule of 
combination. Let bel12 = bel1 ® bel2. Shafer notes that: 
'v'BE IB, \f A �B. bel12(AIB)= bel1 (AlB) 
He considers that this relation fits with Jeffrey's aims. 
His proposal does not fit with C1 and we feel C1 is more 
in the spirit of Jeffrey's updating then Shafer's proposal. 
As noted by Dubois and Prade (1986, 1992), the 
characteristic of Jeffrey's rule is its asymmetry. bel2 is 
'more important' than bel1 in that bel3 must be equal to 
bel2 for all XE.iS' whatever bel1 (requirement C1). In the 
limiting case where $ = �  , bel3 = bel2 and bel1 is 
completely ignored. Of course Dempster's rule of 
combination does not satisfy this idea. Fundanlentally, it 
is a symmetrical rule. 
In Dubois and Prade (1991b, 1992), the authors suggest 
another generalization. 
bel3(A) = I 
B:BE.iS' 
bel1(AIB) 
(B) \-/A _A pll(B) m2 v EVIl' (4.1) 
The normalization factor pl1 (B) is essential in their 
formulation. If it were not introduced, the rule would be 
equivalent to the unnormalized Dempster's rule of 
combination what is exactly what they want to avoid. 
Unfortunately, their proposal fails also to satisfy C l .  
Ichihashi and Tanaka (1989) have suggested the following 
three generalizations of Jeffrey's rule (se also Wagner 
1992): 
where 
bel3(A) = I f(A,B) m2(B) \f AE� 
B:BE.iS' 
bel1(Av B)-bel1(B) 
f(A,B) 
pll(B) 
bel1(AAB) 
f(A,B) = bell (B) 
bel1(A)-bel1(AA B) 
f(A,B) pll(B) 
These proposals fail to satisfy C1 (the first is 4.1). 
Wagner (1992) solves the case where bel1 is a 
probability function in a context of upper and lower 
probabilities. His solution is covered by our solutions. 
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In conclusion, we have presented what we feel is the 
fundamental meaning of Jeffrey's rule and how it 
generalizes within the belief functions framework. The 
applicability of the generalized Jeffrey's rules of 
conditioning resides in the case where the updating 
information corresponds to some constraints that must be 
satisfied by the updated belief function after combination 
of the updating information with the initial state of belief, 
but where the updating information induces a belief 
function only on a subalgebra of the algebra on which the 
initial belief function is defined. It does not covered the 
case of an updating on an unreliable information (what 
Dubois and Prade claim as being appropriately modeled by 
4.1). It requires that the updating information characterized 
by bel2 be such that our revised belief bel3 must be equal 
to bel2 wherever bel2 is defined. Should bel2 be defined 
on the same algebra as bel1 (i.e.,� = $), the updating 
would result into adopting bel2 as the revised belief. That 
requirement fits with the idea of a revision by readaptation 
(or correction) of bel1 by bel2. In a certain sense, it 
satisfies the 'success rule' described for revision (AE K* A· 
Gardenfors 1988). 
The nature of the atoms of $ is important in order to 
apply Jeffrey's rules. In practice, bei2 is provided by a 
source of evidence that specifies bei2 values on some 
elements of� . $ is then the coarsest Boolean subalgebra 
of� that contains all the elements of � on which bel2 
is known. 
References. 
DEMPSTER A.P. (1967) Upper and lower probabilities 
induced by a multiplevalued mapping. Ann. Math. Statistics 
38:325-339. 
DUBOIS D., GARBOLINO P., KYBURG H.E., PRADE H. and 
SMETS Ph. (1991) Quantified Uncertainty. J. Applied Non­
Classical Logics 1:105-197. 
DUBOIS D. and PRADE H. (1986) On the unicity of 
Dempster's rule of combination. Int. J. Intell. Systems 
1:133-142. 
DUBOIS D. and PRADE H. (1991a) Focusing versus Updating 
in Belief Function Theory. Techn. Rep. IRIT. To appear in 
Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. Fedrizzi M., Kaczprzyk 
J. and Yager R. eds, Wiley. 
DUBOIS D. and PRADE H. (199lb) Updating with belief 
functions, ordinal conditi'onal functions and possibility 
measures. In Bonissone P.P., Henrion M., Kanal L.N. and 
Lemmer J.F. eds.Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence 
6.North Holland, Amsteram, 311-329. 
DUBOIS D. and PRADE H. (1992) Belief revision and updates 
in numerical formalism. Tech. Rep. IRIT. 
FAGIN R. and HALPERN J. (1990) A new approach to 
updating beliefs. 6th Conf. on Uncertainty in AI. 
GARDENFORS P. (1988) Knowledge in flux. Modelling the 
dynamics of epistemuic states. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass. 
ICHIHASHI H. and TANAKA H. (1989) Jeffrey-like rules of 
conditioning for the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence. 
Inter. J. Approx. Reasoning 3:143-156. 
JAFFRAY J.Y. (1992) Bayesian Updating and belief 
functions. IEEE Trans. SMC, 22:1144-1152. 
JEFFREY R.C. (1965) The logic of decision. McGraw-Hill, 
(1983) 2nd Ed. Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago. 
KATSUNO H. and MENDELZON A.O. (1991) On the 
difference between updating a knowledge base and revising 
it. Proc. 2nd. Inter. Conf. Principle of Knowledge 
Representation and Reasoning (KR-91), J.Allen, R. Fikes 
and E. Sandewall eds). Morgan-Kaufman, Cambridge, Mass. 
387-394. 
KOHLAS J. and MONNEY P. A. (1990) Modeling and 
reasoning with hints. Technical Report. Inst. Automation 
and OR. Univ. Fribourg. 
LEVI I. (1983) Consonance, dissonance end evidentiary 
mechanisms. in GARDENFORS P., HANSSON B. and 
SAHLIN N.E. (eds) Evidentiary value: philosophical, judicial 
and psychological aspects of a theory. C.W.K. Gleerups, 
Lund, Sweden. p. 27-43. 
PAWLAK Z. (1982) Rough Sets. Int. J. Comput. Inf. Sci. 
11:341-356. 
PEARL J. (1988) Probabilistic reasoning in intelligent 
systems: networks of plausible inference. Morgan Kaufmann 
Pub. San Mateo, Ca, USA. 
RUSPINI E.H. (1986) The logical foundations of evidential 
reasoning. Technical note 408, SRI International, Menlo 
Park, Ca. 
SHAFER G. (1976a) A mathematical theory of evidence. 
Princeton Univ. Press. Princeton, NJ. 
SHAFER G. (1976b) A theory of statistical evidence. in 
Foundations of probability theory, statistical inference, and 
statistical theories of science. Harper and Hooker ed. Reidel, 
Doordrecht-Holland. 
SHAFER G. (1981) Jeffrey's rule of conditioning. Philisophy 
of Sciences, 48:337-362. 
SHAFER G. and TVERSKY A. (1985) Languages and designs 
for probability. Cognitive Sc. 9:309-339. 
SMETS P. (1988) Belief functions. in SMETS Ph, MAMDANI 
A., DUBOIS D. and PRADE H. eds. Non standard logics for 
automated reasoning. Academic Press, London p 253-286. 
MORAL S. (1993) Personal communications. 
SMETS P. (1991) About updating. in D'Ambrosio B., Smets 
P., and Bonissone P.P. eds, Uncertainty in AI 91, Morgan 
Kaufmann, San Mateo, Ca, USA, 1991, 378-385. 
SMETS P. (1992a) The nature of the unnormalized beliefs 
encountered in the transferable belief model. in Dubois D., 
Wellman M.P., d' Ambrosio B. and Smets P. Uncertainty in 
AI 92. Morgan Kaufmann, San Mateo, Ca, USA, 1992, 
pg.292-297. 
SMETS P. (1992b) An axiomatic justifiaction for the use of 
belief function to quantify beliefs. IRIDIA-TR- 92-11. 
SMETS P. (1993a) Belief functions: the disjunctive rule of 
combination and the generalized Bayesian theorem. 
Forthcoming in Int. J. Approximate Reasoning. 
SMETS P. (1993b) The probability of the deductibility. 
Submitted. 
SMETS P. and KENNES R. (1990) The transferable belief 
model. Technical Report: IRIDIA-TR-90-14. 
SUPPES P. and ZANOTTI M. (1977) On using random 
relations to generate upper and lower probabilities. 
Synthesis 36:427-440. 
WAGNER C.G. (1992) Generalizing Jeffrey 
Conditionalization. in Dubois D., Wellman M.P., 
d' Ambrosio B. and Smets P. Uncertainty in AI 92. Morgan 
Kaufmann, San Mateo, Ca, USA, 1992, pg.331-335. 
